FARO stands for Frontline Record of Online Harms. Technology-related harm usually reaches the public one case at a time: a school in one country, a family in another, each easy to treat as an exception. This directory puts those cases side by side to help grassroots actors see where others face the same issues they do, and to help governments and regulators see the bigger picture of the harms occurring. The directory describes what its records contain. It does not measure how often these harms occur, and a country with few records may simply have little published about it.
How to use this directory: Topics are filterable for FARO reports that have already been created based on these incidents. The harms and response patterns shown are those featured there. To see the incidents used in a country-specific report, choose that country under Country report. Pick a pattern or evidence type to see on the map which countries have matching records. Click a country on the map or in the list to see its records below. Use the filter to search for keywords or specific sources.
Shaded countries have at least one record. Choose a pattern to see where it appears.
At least one matching recordNo matching recordSelected country
Shading shows only that a country has at least one record in this directory that matches your selection, and every shaded country looks the same on purpose. It says nothing about how often these harms occur there. Pattern filters only cover records classified so far, and small countries are easy to miss on a map, so use the list as well.
Students subjected to facial recognition processing without valid consent
A high school in the United Kingdom introduced facial recognition technology for student catering services. Students were processed under an opt-out consent model and no DPIA was completed before deployment. The ICO found that students were deprived of the ability to properly exercise their rights and freedoms in relation to the processing between March and November 2023.
Students submitted AI-generated assignments they could not explain
Students reportedly submitted AI-generated assignments through copy-and-paste methods and were unable to explain the work. The consequence described was plagiarism and reduced learning outcomes. This is a personal interview. Source available to SHIELD.
Source: SHIELD - APS
Date source link verified: 16/10/2026
Technology in Education
KazakhstanAcademic research
Students using 100Ballov had educational activity data transmitted through AddThis advertising infrastructure
100Ballov, a website endorsed by Kazakhstan's Education Ministry and adopted by schools as the 'educational portal for schoolchildren and students,' was found to send information about its students to AddThis, a marketing company owned by Oracle, through six cookies that in turn loaded four more trackers from AddThis's advertising partners (two DoubleClick, two Tapad). The site has no privacy policy; its 'Privacy Policy' link points back to the homepage. Oracle said any receipt of children's data through AddThis would violate its policies but did not say whether it received data from 100Ballov. 100Ballov did not respond to HRW.
Students using a Russian online educational platform had online behavior recorded through session replay tools
HRW found seven Russian educational websites using Yandex session recording: Russian Electronic School, My Achievements, Moscow Electronic School, Sirius, My School is Online, Digital Lessons and SberClass. Yandex describes the tool as recording clicks, scrolls, keystrokes and mouse movements in a single replayable recording. All seven are apparently designed for children's educational use.
Students using Aprende 2.0 had educational activity incorporated into advertising data systems
@prende 2.0 (the report's spelling) is listed by HRW among 56 government-built or government-financed educational products found transmitting children's data to advertising technology companies. HRW's table shows it has a privacy policy.
Students using Daryn Online were subjected to session recording surveillance
HRW found Daryn Online using Yandex session recording, which Yandex describes as recording clicks, scrolls, keystrokes and mouse movements, and detected key logging on the site as well. HRW also detected the website transmitting children's personal data to Google, CloudFlare, Yandex and Facebook. Daryn Online was one of 23 educational websites endorsed by eight governments that HRW found using session recorders, and it did not respond to HRW's request for comment.
Students using DELIMa had educational data shared through advertising technology infrastructure
DELIMa is listed by HRW among 56 government-built or government-financed educational products found transmitting children's data to advertising technology companies. HRW's table shows it has no privacy policy.
Students using EBS Online Classes had keystrokes captured through key logging technologies
HRW listed EBS Online Classes, a South Korean educational website, among 16 websites it found using key logging, which captures what users type into forms, such as names, usernames and passwords, before they press submit. All but one of the 16 are marketed for children's educational use. EBS told HRW that its EBS Online Class site does not share users' data with third-party companies.
Students using Edmodo had contact information and communication data accessible to third parties
HRW's analysis of the Edmodo Android app, one of the products endorsed by Nigeria's government for learning during Covid-19 school closures, found it had the ability to collect advertising IDs, contacts and contacts' photos, phone numbers, call logs, and camera and microphone access. The app is privately developed, apparently designed for children, and had over 10 million installs. It embeds Google Crashlytics, Firebase Analytics and AdMob, plus JW Player and Matomo.
Students using Edmodo had contact information and communication data accessible to third parties – Colombia
HRW's analysis of the Edmodo Android app, one of the products endorsed by Colombia's government for learning during Covid-19 school closures, found it had the ability to collect advertising IDs, contacts and contacts' photos, phone numbers, call logs, and camera and microphone access. The app is privately developed, apparently designed for children, and had over 10 million installs. It embeds Google Crashlytics, Firebase Analytics and AdMob, plus JW Player and Matomo.
Students using Edmodo had contact information and communication data accessible to third parties – Egypt
HRW's analysis of the Edmodo Android app, one of the products endorsed by Egypt's government for learning during Covid-19 school closures, found it had the ability to collect advertising IDs, contacts and contacts' photos, phone numbers, call logs, and camera and microphone access. The app is privately developed, apparently designed for children, and had over 10 million installs. It embeds Google Crashlytics, Firebase Analytics and AdMob, plus JW Player and Matomo.
Students using Edmodo had contact information and communication data accessible to third parties – Ghana
HRW's analysis of the Edmodo Android app, one of the products endorsed by Ghana's government for learning during Covid-19 school closures, found it had the ability to collect advertising IDs, contacts and contacts' photos, phone numbers, call logs, and camera and microphone access. The app is privately developed, apparently designed for children, and had over 10 million installs. It embeds Google Crashlytics, Firebase Analytics and AdMob, plus JW Player and Matomo.
Students using Edmodo had contact information and communication data accessible to third parties – Romania
HRW's analysis of the Edmodo Android app, one of the products endorsed by Romania's government for learning during Covid-19 school closures, found it had the ability to collect advertising IDs, contacts and contacts' photos, phone numbers, call logs, and camera and microphone access. The app is privately developed, apparently designed for children, and had over 10 million installs. It embeds Google Crashlytics, Firebase Analytics and AdMob, plus JW Player and Matomo.
Students using Edmodo had contact information and communication data accessible to third parties – Thailand
HRW's analysis of the Edmodo Android app, one of the products endorsed by Thailand's government for learning during Covid-19 school closures, found it had the ability to collect advertising IDs, contacts and contacts' photos, phone numbers, call logs, and camera and microphone access. The app is privately developed, apparently designed for children, and had over 10 million installs. It embeds Google Crashlytics, Firebase Analytics and AdMob, plus JW Player and Matomo.
Students using educational platform had personal data transmitted to Facebook advertising systems
HRW observed ȘcoalaIntuitext sending user data to advertising technology companies through third-party marketing cookies, the Facebook Pixel and Google Analytics' 'remarketing audiences' feature, on pages likely to be accessed by children, including a page titled 'Children' that describes the platform as intended for primary school students (preparatory classes to grade IV). HRW found no evidence that these practices were limited to adults. Softwin, the operator, acknowledged sending data through these tools but said it does so to target adults, and that no children's data is used for advertising or other commercial purposes.
Students using Extramarks application had contacts information and location data shared without disclosure
Extramarks, a privately developed learning app apparently designed for children with an estimated 100,000 installs, was found by HRW to have the ability to collect children's precise location (GPS, last known location and Wi-Fi network name), contacts and contacts' photos, call and SMS logs, camera and microphone access, and advertising, Wi-Fi MAC and IMEI identifiers. HRW said the app does not disclose collecting contacts information in its privacy policy, and that this data was neither necessary for the app to function nor of educational benefit. HRW listed it among nine apps potentially engaging in ID bridging, and Extramarks did not respond to HRW's request for comment.
Students using government educational platform Rumah Belajar had advertising identifiers and location information shared with Facebook and Google
Rumah Belajar, a website and app developed and operated by Indonesia's Ministry of Education and Culture for preschool, primary and secondary students during the pandemic, was observed sending children's Android advertising IDs to Google and Facebook. Its privacy policy says the collected device identifiers may be used to show advertisements and to advertise on third-party websites after a visit, and HRW lists it among four government products that explicitly disclose using student data for behavioral advertising.
Students using Kelas Pintar educational application had contact information exposed to advertising technology systems
Kelas Pintar, a privately developed Indonesian learning app apparently designed for children with an estimated 1 million installs, was found by HRW to have the ability to collect children's advertising IDs, IMEI numbers, contacts and contacts' photos, and camera access. It embeds Google and Facebook analytics SDKs and Adjust. Its privacy policy does not disclose the collection of contacts information, which HRW found neither necessary for the app to function nor of educational benefit. HRW listed it among nine apps potentially engaging in ID bridging, which can bypass privacy controls such as resetting the advertising ID. Kelas Pintar did not respond to HRW's request for comment.
Students using Kenya Education Cloud had personal data transmitted to advertising companies
Kenya Education Cloud is listed by HRW among 56 government-built or government-financed educational products found transmitting children's data to advertising technology companies. HRW's table shows it has no privacy policy.
Students using Ruangguru had behavioral data transmitted to Facebook for profiling
Ruangguru, an app recommended by Indonesia's Ministry of Education and Culture and used by over 10 million students in its free pandemic version, continuously logged what children did in its virtual classrooms and sent that log to Facebook as well as to itself. Its privacy policy says it may collect interaction information such as scrolling, clicks and mouse movement to serve advertisements, and may share data with advertisers and ad networks without naming them.
Students using Ruangguru had classroom activity and location data transmitted for advertising purposes
Forensic analysis for HRW found that Ruangguru collects students' precise location, Android advertising ID, device information and in-app navigation, and transmits them to AppsFlyer and Facebook. The app also has the ability to access call logs, camera and microphone. Its privacy policy says it combines data it holds on students with information from other sources for advertising and other purposes. AppsFlyer told HRW it does not sell or serve ads, build targeting profiles or sell data, and did not address the questions about Ruangguru specifically.
Students using Shad educational application had location and contact data collected without disclosure
Shad, an app built by Iran's Education Ministry for online learning during the pandemic, reported more than 18 million active users in October 2021. HRW's analysis of its code found it can collect children's precise location, including current and last known location, Wi-Fi network name, IP address, contacts and any saved photos of those contacts. HRW lists Shad as having no privacy policy, and Iran has no data protection law; a draft act pending since 2018 has no specific protections for children.
Students using Stoodi had personal information captured through undisclosed key logging
Children's names and search entries were captured through key logging and transmitted to a third-party advertising company. Even if children decided not to submit their information, the captured data was still sent automatically. Stoodi is a website recommended by the São Paulo Education Ministry and was one of 16 sites HRW found using key logging. Its privacy policy did not disclose the key logging or that the data would go to a third-party company for commercial use.
Students using Taleemabad had location and device identifiers shared with third parties
Taleemabad, a privately developed Pakistani learning app apparently designed for children with an estimated 1 million installs, was found by HRW to have the ability to collect children's precise location (including GPS, last known location and Wi-Fi network name), advertising IDs and IMEI numbers. It embeds Google and Facebook analytics SDKs. HRW listed it among nine apps potentially engaging in ID bridging, and Taleemabad did not respond to HRW's request for comment about it.
Support teacher allegedly shows pornographic videos to middle school pupils under pretext of tutoring, then continues via social media group
A female support teacher at a middle school was arrested in January 2025, accused of taking pupils into a school room under the pretext of tutoring, showing them pornographic videos and sexually abusing one of them, starting in October 2023. When the room was closed, she allegedly continued the abuse through a private social media group, sending sexually explicit messages and threatening the pupils with academic and personal retaliation. Six child victims were interviewed by authorities; charges include sexual violence and corruption of minors.
Survey: Pornographic and violent content in Dutch primary-school class chats
A national news outlet surveyed approximately 400 Dutch primary schools and found that several schools reported pornographic and extremely violent video material being shared within class-wide chat groups, alongside more common concerns like online bullying and privacy violations. Ninety-three percent of responding schools said children's online behavior caused unrest at school, though pornographic content was one of several concerns cited rather than the majority issue.
Suspended worker’s final pay of about 400 dollars withheld for months
A worker says the platform suspended them for a terms violation with no explanation and withheld final pay for over 20 hours of work, close to 400 dollars, because they could not reach their payout screen. They say they followed up for months demanding payment or an explanation and received nothing. BBB lists the complaint as Unanswered by the business.
Suspended worker’s pending payments for completed tasks frozen
A worker says the platform suspended their account for a terms violation without warning or explanation and froze their pending payments for completed tasks. They ask for an explanation and for release of the payments. The text has unfilled placeholders, such as the date and membership length, and reads like a template letter; the amount is not stated. BBB lists the complaint as Unanswered by the business.
Sweden – primary school students viewed porn and horror content despite active web filter
Lower-grade (primary-school-aged) students in Sweden were found to have viewed pornographic and horror-themed content during class time despite the school having an active content filter in place. This indicates a filter-bypass failure rather than an absence of safeguards, which is a distinct and arguably more concerning technical failure mode than districts with no filtering at all. Multiple students appear to have been involved based on the framing of the report, though exact numbers are not specified.
Sweden – warning on violent content on school iPads
A father warned that his primary-school-aged child watched violent videos on an iPad during his free time. The father is strongly questioning why the municipality doesn't have internet access protection.
Switzerland – Regional youth prosecutor warns pornography in class chats is a frequent pattern
After pornographic images were shared in a school group chat in Switzerland, a parent reported the matter to police, triggering an investigation involving an entire class. Authorities confiscated students' phones, analyzed device data, and interviewed the young people involved to determine who had sent, received, or stored the content. The article explains that Swiss juvenile prosecutors regularly encounter pornography-related cases originating in class and group chats, often following reports from parents, classmates, social media platforms, or discoveries during other investigations. Depending on the circumstances, consequences can range from warnings and mandatory media education courses to community service or more serious penalties.
Task platform balance stuck below withdrawal minimum for over two years
A data worker in Kenya has a balance of about $0.16 on a task platform that requires $10 to withdraw. Task scarcity has kept the balance from growing, and the worker’s last withdrawal was more than two years ago.
Source: Data Labelers Association
Date source link verified: 22/10/2026
About the records
Each record is a short summary of an incident described in a public source or collected through an interview by SHIELD or its partners. Records are reviewed by people before they appear here. Names and identifying details are removed: where a person appears, a role, age band and gender stand in for the name, and dates and places for minors are generalised. Every record links to its original source and shows the date that link was last checked. Records are classified with shared harm categories. The classification is SHIELD's own, so it can differ from how a source describes the incident.
Using the directory
You are welcome to read, link to and quote individual records with credit to FARO. Please do not copy, scrape or republish the dataset in bulk, or use it to train or test automated systems, without written permission. To ask for permission, use the SHIELD contact form. The original sources keep their own rights, and the link on each record leads to them.
How to cite
SHIELD-APS. Frontline Record of Online Harms (FARO). DIRECTORY-URL. Accessed [date]. To cite a particular selection, use the web address shown after you set the filters.
When you rely on the facts of an incident, cite the original source it links to. When you rely on the classification, the patterns or the country report, cite FARO. Please describe the records as documented incidents and do not present counts or country coverage as how often these harms happen. A country with few records may simply have little published about it.
Corrections and removals
If a record is wrong, a link no longer works, or you are described in a record and want it changed or removed, use the SHIELD contact form and include the title of the record. We review each request and update or remove the record where the request is justified.
Report an incident
Know of a documented incident that belongs here? Send it through the incident form. A public source, such as a news report, a court or regulator decision, or a research publication, helps us verify it quickly. Submissions without a public source are kept anonymous and are not tied to named products or companies. Please leave out the names of children and of anyone who has not agreed to be named. Submissions are reviewed before anything is published, and sending one does not guarantee a record.
Manage Consent
To provide the best experiences, we use technologies like cookies to store and/or access device information. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.
Functional
Always active
The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.
Preferences
The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
Statistics
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes.The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.
Marketing
The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.
To provide the best experiences, we use technologies like cookies to store and/or access device information. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.
Functional
Always active
The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.
Preferences
The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
Statistics
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes.The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.
Marketing
The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.
